passlib.hash.crypt16 - Crypt16

Danger

This algorithm is dangerously insecure by modern standards. It is trivially broken, and should not be used if at all possible. For new code, see the list of recommended hashes.

This class implements the Crypt16 password hash, commonly found on Ultrix and Tru64. It’s a minor modification of des_crypt, which allows passwords of up to 16 characters.

See also

password hash usage – for examples of how to use this class via the common hash interface.

Interface

class passlib.hash.crypt16

This class implements the crypt16 password hash, and follows the PasswordHash API.

It supports a fixed-length salt.

The using() method accepts the following optional keywords:

Parameters:
  • salt (str) – Optional salt string. If not specified, one will be autogenerated (this is recommended). If specified, it must be 2 characters, drawn from the regexp range [./0-9A-Za-z].
  • truncate_error (bool) –

    By default, crypt16 will silently truncate passwords larger than 16 bytes. Setting truncate_error=True will cause hash() to raise a PasswordTruncateError instead.

    New in version 1.7.

  • relaxed (bool) –

    By default, providing an invalid value for one of the other keywords will result in a ValueError. If relaxed=True, and the error can be corrected, a PasslibHashWarning will be issued instead. Correctable errors include salt strings that are too long.

    New in version 1.6.

Format

An example hash (of the string passphrase) is aaX/UmCcBrceQ0kQGGWKTbuE. A crypt16 hash string has the format saltchecksum_1checksum_2, where:

  • salt is the salt, stored as a 2 character hash64-encoded 12-bit integer (aa in the example).
  • each checksum_i is a separate checksum, stored as an 11 character hash64-big-encoded 64-bit integer (X/UmCcBrceQ and 0kQGGWKTbuE in the example).

Note

This hash is frequently confused with the bigcrypt hash algorithm, as it has the same size and uses the same character set as a bigcrypt hash of a password with 9 to 16 characters; though the actual algorithms are different.

Security Issues

Crypt16 is dangerously flawed:

  • It suffers from all the flaws of des_crypt.
  • Compared to des-crypt, its smaller number of rounds makes it even more vulnerable to brute-force attacks.
  • For a given salt, passwords under 9 characters all have the same 2nd checksum. Given the 12-bit salt size, all such 2nd checksums can be easily pre-computed; making an attack easier, and giving away information about password size.
  • Since both checksums use the same salt, they can be attacked at once (by doing 5 rounds, checking the result against checksum 2, doing 15 rounds more, and checking the result against checksum 1).

Deviations

This implementation of crypt16 deviates from public documentation of the format in one way:

  • Unicode Policy:

    The original crypt16 algorithm was designed for 7-bit us-ascii encoding only (as evidenced by the fact that it discards the 8th bit of all password bytes).

    In order to provide support for unicode strings, Passlib will encode unicode passwords using utf-8 before running them through crypt16. If a different encoding is desired by an application, the password should be encoded before handing it to Passlib.

Footnotes

[1]One source of information about bigcrypt & crypt16 - http://www.mail-archive.com/exim-dev@exim.org/msg00970.html